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Abstract. We present a growing collection of Android apps collected
from several sources, including the official Google Play app market and
a growing collection of various metadata of those collected apps aiming
at facilitating the Android-relevant research works. Our dataset by far
has collected over five million apps and over 20 types of metadata such
as VirusTotal reports. Our objective of collecting this dataset is to con-
tribute to ongoing research efforts, as well as to enable new potential
research topics on Android Apps. By releasing our app and metadata
set to the research community, we also aim at encouraging our fellow
researchers to engage in reproducible experiments.
This article will be continuously updated based on the growing apps
and metadata collected in the AndroZoo project. If you have specific
metadata that you want to collect from AndroZoo and which are not yet
provided by far, please let us know. We will thereby prioritise it in our
collecting process so as to provide it to our fellow researchers in a short
manner.
1 Introduction
Mobile app development has witnessed an unprecedented growth in recent years
due to the increase in affordability and adoption of smart powerful handheld
devices. In particular, the Android ecosystem, with its open Operating System
and the available Software Development Kit, have empowered developers to pro-
duce millions of apps for diverse user tasks, ranging from emails and games to
payment and health activities. Unlike the few established traditional desktop
applications which have been thoroughly studied by the research community,
Android apps are legion, each having a large share of user base. Analysing these
apps at a large scale is however challenging since market maintainers implement
several restrictions in collecting apps. In this context, researchers proceed in the
best effort way to reuse small datasets (which are generally obsolete) or collect a
limited number of samples (which may not be representative), leading to studies
which may be biased and experiments which are often not reproducible. To ad-
dress the problem of Android dataset collection, we have invested in a long-term
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effort to crawl apps for the research community. After several years of crawling,
we have already stored over five million of apps. With AndroZoo, we aim to pro-
vide the software engineering research community with an unrestricted, scalable
and up-to-date access to Android apps. To that end, we have developed spe-
cialised crawlers for several market places to automatically browse their content,
find Android applications that could be retrieved for free, and download them
into our repository. To the best of our knowledge, the total number of apps that
we have collected constitutes the largest dataset of Android apps ever used in
published Android research studies. Often, it is impossible to know beforehand
how many apps are available in a given market. Therefore, some of the markets
for which we wrote dedicated crawlers proved to be much smaller than initially
expected. The crawlers we wrote follow two main objectives: a) Collect as many
apps as possible, and b) Ensure the lowest possible impact on the market infras-
tructure. These two objectives increased the cost of writing such crawlers since
for every market a manual analysis of the website has been performed in order to
detect and filter out pages with different URL but with similar contents, for ex-
ample, lists that can be sorted according to different criteria. Similarly, a unique
identifier for every APK on one market had to be found, so that deduplication
can happen before downloading apps. While reducing the load we incur to mar-
kets web servers may not seem strictly necessary to the objective of collecting
apps, it vastly reduces the likelihood of being banned by market owners and
hence, helps building and maintaining in the long term a large and up-to-date
dataset.
This article is an extended version of a data paper entitled “AndroZoo: Col-
lecting Millions of Android Apps for the Research Community” published at the
International Conference on Mining Software Repositories (MSR) 2016. In this
extension, in addition to collect Android apps for the research community, we
further provide to the research community various metadata of Android apps.
The main idea behinds this extension is to facilitate the access of our Andro-
Zoo app set. Indeed, based on the feedback collected from AndroZoo’s users, we
observe that the main bottleneck of analyzing the whole AndroZoo app set is
the bandwidth. A lot of time and resources are needed in order to access all the
available AndroZoo apps. However, since some apps in AndroZoo may not be
necessary for certain analysis (e.g., sending apps that have no reflection access
to reflection analysis tools), it could be much efficient to only download and
analyse (the small set of) relevant apps. To this end, we provide to the research
community various metadata of Android apps that are expected to be used by
users of AndroZoo to pre-select relevant apps. Furthermore, since it is usually
unavoidable to compute the metadata of Android apps for supporting further
analysis, our effort, which is done once, could potentially avoid the same work
being repeated by other researchers, resulting in less computing resources spent
in our society.
Outline. The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section 2
presents the architecture developed to collect Android apps while Section 3
presents the collection of various metadata associated to AndroZoo apps. Sec-
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tion 4 then enumerates some implications that leverage AndroZoo to perform
various analyses. Finally, Section 5 and 6 discusses some limitations and provides
concluding remarks respectively.
The AndroZoo apps and metadata are available at the following website:
https://androzoo.uni.lu
2 App Collection
For most app sources, we developed a dedicated web crawler, where every can-
didate app which is available for free runs through a processing pipeline that:
(1) Ensures this app has not already been downloaded; (2) Downloads the file;
(3) Computes its SHA256 checksum; (4) Archives the file. To check that an app
has not been already downloaded, we first identify a unique identifier for APKs
in the market associated to the crawler, and store in a database an entry market
nameapp identifier. As a consequence, and because it is impossible to deter-
mine that two files from two markets are the same unless both are downloaded
and compared, the deduplication is local to one market, meaning that one file
from one market is downloaded exactly once, regardless of whether or not it has
already been downloaded from another market.
By far, we are collecting apps from around ten app markets or repositories.
We now describe some representative ones
– Google Play. The official market of Android is a website that allows users to
browse its content through a web browser. Apps cannot however be down-
loaded through a web browser. Instead, Google provides an Android app2
that uses a proprietary protocol to communicate with Google Play servers.
No app, however, can be downloaded from Google Play without a valid
Google account (not even free Apps). Both issues thus outlined were over-
come using open-source implementations of the proprietary protocol and by
creating free Google accounts. The remaining constraint was time, as Google
also enforces a strict account-level rate-limit: a given account is not allowed
to download more than a certain number of apps in a given time frame.
Google Play has several features that make automatic crawling harder than
other markets. As a result, a more elaborated crawler is required for this
market. Google further enforces limits on the number of apps that can be
downloaded per Google account in a given period from one IP address. To
overcome those limits, we wrote a software dedicated to finding and down-
loading apps from Google Play. This software is built with two components:
a central dispatcher, and a download agent. We have used agents on up
to seven machines located in Luxembourg, France and Canada. On three of
these machines, we ran two instances of the agent, one using exclusively IPv4
connectivity and the other using IPv6. Because IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are
not linked in any way, this allows to hiding the fact that those two agents
run on the same machine, hence enabling us to increase the number of apps
downloaded from one computer without increasing the risk of being black-
listed.
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– Anzhi. Anzhi, the largest alternative market of our dataset, is operated from
China and targets the Chinese Android user base. It stores and distributes
apps that are written in the Chinese languages, and provides a less strict
screening policy than that of Google Play.
– AppChina. AppChina, another Chinese market, has used to enforce drastic
scraping protections such as a 1Mb/s bandwidth limitation and a several-
hour ban if using simultaneously more than one connection to the service.
– F-Droid. F-Droid is a repository of Free and open-source Android apps that
users can download and install on their devices. Many of the apps found on
F-Droid are modified versions of apps that are released to other markets by
their developers. The modifications brought by F-Droid are usually linked
for example with advertisement.
3 Metadata Collection
Our objective in this work is to facilitate the access of AndroZoo by providing to
the research community not only a large set of Android apps but also sufficient
metadata associated with those apps. Users of AndroZoo can therefore to pre-
select a set of apps that are all relevant to their research. As a result, only
those selected apps need to be downloaded, resulting in fewer constraints to
AndroZoo’s users, who otherwise have to download all the available apps of
AndroZoo, confronting massive resource costs (e.g., bandwidth and disk).
Table 1 presents an overview of the metadata we currently provide. So far,
we have collected for the research community four types of metadata containing
in total 24 items. We now provide brief descriptions to them respectively.
3.1 APK
Android apps are released and distributed through APK files. For each Android
APK file, we provide six artefacts for our fellow researchers.
– SHA256, SHA1, MD5: We provide three hash values (SHA256, SHA1,
and MD5) to uniquely identify an Android app.
– APK Size: We provide the APK size information (in byte) of a given app
aiming at providing a quick means for researchers to calculate how much
space they may need in order to download the app from AndroZoo to their
local disk.
– Market: For each APK, when crawling from a market, we also record
from which market it is downloaded. Since we do not have a good means
to check if a given APK has already been downloaded from other mar-
kets, the same APK could be downloaded from several markets. This mar-
ket artefact represents the market where the app is downloaded from. If
the app appears in multiple markets, the market artefact correspondingly
shows all the available markets with each separated by a vertical virgule
(e.g., play.google.com—anzhi indicates that the app is downloaded from both
Google Play and the Anzhi market).
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Table 1. Metadata Overview.
Type Name Example
APK
SHA256 00010F599EB0EDC52F5781E1892B7B50B922055FCDF766ECC45B50C8E25E84B6
SHA1 9AC02C1AACF6A7E41E013E19677DDEBD1DC7900D
MD5 C20F5F99F20745109591DD422C4DCF56
Apk Size 8156810
Market play.google.com
Certificate C=RU, ST=MO, L=Moscow, O=gera, OU=gera, CN=gera
Manifest
Application ID com.gera.ArtScienceMuseumJigsawPuzzles
Version Code 1
API Level 14
Permission List cf. Listing 1.1
Feature List cf. Listing 1.2
DEX
Dex Size 8247212
Dex Date 14/02/2016 00:36:34
Native Code true
Crypto Code true
Dynamic Code true
Reflection true
Class List cf. Listing 1.3
Releasingα
Description Art Science Museum Puzzle Jigsaw game dedicated to ...
Category Puzzle
Author gera
Rating Score 4.0
Installs 100 − 500
Requires Android 4.0 and up
Updated Date May 13, 2016
Contact Email geraraaaa@gmail.com
Security
VirusTotal Report cf. Listing 1.4
AndroBugs Report cf. Listing 1.5
Others
Piggybacking App Pairs https://github.com/lilicoding/Piggybacking
Common Libraries https://github.com/lilicoding/CommonLibraries/blob/master/libraries/cl_91.txt
Ad Libraries https://github.com/lilicoding/CommonLibraries/blob/master/libraries/ad_240.txt
App Lineages cf. Listing 1.6
α Example presented in this type is based on the latest information of Google Play.
– Certificate: we provide the certificate signature of a given app, which is
usually used to represent the signature of its developers. Literature works
recurrently leverage this metadata to pinpoint repackaged (or piggybacked)
Android apps, which usually involve a change of app signatures (i.e., devel-
opers) [1].
3.2 Manifest
Every Android app is assembled with a global configuration file called Android-
Manifest.xml (hereinafter referred as manifest), which plays an important role
for configuring app’s permissions, components, etc. In this work, we provide five
artefacts that are directly extracted from the manifest file of a given app. Those
five artefacts are as follows:
– Application ID: Application ID is used to uniquely identify an app on a
device and in Google Play. For example, two apps with the same application
ID cannot be installed concurrently on the same device. It is also disallowed
to update an app in Google Play with a different application ID.
– Version Code: Version code is provided for app developers to name the
different app versions. Theoretically, version code increases as the app up-
dated. Literature work leverage this information to build app lineages (i.e.,
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1 android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
2 android.permission.INTERNET
3 android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
4 android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
5 android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
6 android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
7 android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER
8 android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
Listing 1.1. Permission List Example. This List is Extracted from App
com.gera.ArtScienceMuseumJigsawPuzzles.
1 android.hardware.faketouch
2 android.hardware.location
3 android.hardware.screen.portrait
4 android.hardware.wifi
Listing 1.2. Feature List Example. This List is Extracted from App
com.gera.ArtScienceMuseumJigsawPuzzles.
sorted app versions of the same app) for supporting the investigation of app
evolution.
– API Level: API level specifies the SDK version that the app is imple-
mented. Since different API levels may provide different features, users of
AndroZoo could thus leverage this information to conduct evolution-based
investigations, especially in couple with the evolution investigation of the
Android operating system. As an example, Li et al. [2] have leveraged this
information to investigate the evolution of inaccessible Android APIs (i.e.,
internal and hidden APIs) of the framework code.
– Permission List: Permissions, declared by app developers, are used by
Android system to grant the access of protected parts and controls the in-
teraction with other apps. Listing 1.1 illustrates an example of permission
list. Many state-of-the-art works have leveraged permissions to perform spe-
cific analyses [3,4]. In this work, we provide directly the used permissions to
the research community for boosting the research of permission-based inves-
tigations. Uses of AndroZoo now can collect the declared permissions of a
given app without actually downloading the app.
– Feature List: Similar to the permission list, we provide the feature list
containing features defined in the manifest (cf. Listing 1.2) to the research
community for helping researchers pre-select such apps that have all used
certain features.
3.3 DEX
DEX is the file format of the so-called Dalvik Executable format, which stores
the actual code of Android apps. Every Android app should have a DEX file
called classes.dex in the top direct of a given APK file, which is also the target
where all the metadata in this group collected from.
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– Dex Size: Similar to APK size, Dex size provides another means for users
of AndroZoo to pre-select their favoured apps, e.g., apps with their Dex
size smaller than 1 megabyte.
– Dex Date: Dex (assembly) date is extracted based on the last modified
time of the Dex file. It can be used to represent the assembling time of a
given app and thereby to support all the time-relevant investigations.
– Native Code: Native code, if true, shows that the app has accessed native
code, which is usually written in C or C++.
– Crypto Code: Crypto code, if true, reveals that the app has somehow
leveraged crypto code. Researchers such as the authors of [5] could benefit
from this artefact to only collect (e.g., download from AndroZoo) crypto-
relevant Android apps, avoiding the download of irrelevant apps and also
the analysis of those potential irrelevant apps.
– Dynamic Code: Dynamic code, if true, indicates that the app has loaded
additional code at runtime.
– Reflection: Reflection, if true, demonstrates that the app has accessed re-
flective code. Usually, if the dynamic code item is true, reflection item should
be also true, as the additionally loaded code should normally be accessed
through reflection.
– Class List: Class list enumerates all the class names of an app (cf. List-
ing 1.3). We expect this information to be used by researchers for selecting
apps with accessing specific classes. For example, researchers could leverage
this information to select a set of apps with which all of them have integrated
with ad library com.wandoujia.ads.
3.4 Releasing
In addition to APK-related metadata, we also attempt to collect other metadata
that are published along with the release of the app, e.g., such information that
is provided by Android app markets such as Google Play. So far, we collect eight
artefacts for an APK and the collection is only performed for Google Play apps.
It is also worth to mention that we only store the latest releasing metadata. In
other words, based on our current policy, even if the releasing metadata exists
for a given app, our crawling program will overwrite them anyway based on the
newly crawled information.
– Description: Description artefact is a paragraph of text that is provided by
app developers to depict the basic functionality of the app, so as to motivate
users to download and install. Researchers could leverage this information to
check against the app code behaviour, as what has been presented by Gorla
et al. [6].
– Category: Category artefact illustrates the group that the app belongs to.
Normally, apps from the same group would potentially share more or less the
same functionality. Researchers could leverage this information to demon-
strate the diversity of their app set. In general, more category considered,
more diverse the dataset is.
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1 com.amazon.device.ads.Ad
2 com.amazon.device.ads.AdActivity
3 com.applovin.impl.sdk.cg
4 com.applovin.impl.sdk.ch
5 com.appodeal.ads.interstitial.v
6 com.appodeal.ads.interstitial.w
7 com.chartboost.sdk.CBLocation
8 com.chartboost.sdk.Chartboost
9 com.facebook.ssp.internal.g$7
10 com.facebook.ssp.internal.g$a
11 com.gera.ArtScienceMuseumJigsawPuzzles.BuildConfig
12 com.gera.ArtScienceMuseumJigsawPuzzles.R
13 com.google.ads.AdRequest$Gender
14 com.google.ads.AdSize
15 com.google.android.gms.internal.zzcy
16 com.google.android.gms.internal.zzcz
17 com.inmobi.rendering.InMobiAdActivity$4
18 com.inmobi.rendering.InMobiAdActivity$5
19 com.mopub.common.AdFormat
20 com.mopub.common.AdReport
21 com.revmob.android.d
22 com.revmob.android.e
23 com.startapp.android.publish.Ad
24 com.startapp.android.publish.Ad$1
25 com.yandex.metrica.a
26 com.yandex.metrica.b
27 ru.mail.android.mytarget.core.enums.b
28 ru.mail.android.mytarget.core.facades.a
29 scala.collection.SeqView
30 scala.collection.SeqViewLike
Listing 1.3. Simplified Example of Class List.
– Author: Author artefact indicates the developer of the app.
– Rating Score: Rating Score artefact is a float number that is computed
based on all the app reviewers’ ratings, which is also used by app markets
to rank their hosted apps.
– Installs: Installs artefact illustrates the range of possible installs the app
has received. Roughly speaking, the more installs an app receives, the more
popular the app is.
– Requires Android: Requires Android artefact provides the range of An-
droid OS versions that the app requires running. For example, 4.0 and up
indicates that the app can only be installed and launched at devices running
Android OS with version Ice Cream Sandwich (i.e., 4.0 or API level 14) or
above versions that are released later.
– Updated Date: Updated Date artefact illustrates when the latest app ver-
sion is uploaded to the market.
– Contact: Contact artefact provides the email address of the authors of the
app. Researchers could resort to this information to contact the app devel-
opers for recommending bug fixes or simply requesting for answering some
surveys.
3.5 Security
As revealed in our recent systematic literature review (SLR), security remains
the most targeted topic in the field of static analysis of Android apps [7]. Towards
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1 {"_id":"00010 F599EB0EDC52F5781E1892B7B50B922055FCDF766ECC45B50C8E25E84B6",
2 "scans":{
3 "Bkav":{"detected":true ,"result":"Android.Adware.RevMob .88C5"},
4 "ESET -NOD32":{"detected":true ,"result":"a variant of Android/Inmobi.C
potentially unsafe"},
5 "Fortinet":{"detected":true ,"result":"Android/Generic.S.1BE3EB!tr"},
6 "AVG":{"detected":true ,"result":"Android/G2P.R.0 C64D4E32B5E"}
7 "McAfee":{"detected":false ,"result":null},
8 ... ...
9 "Qihoo -360":{"detected":false ,"result":null}
10 }}
Listing 1.4. Simplified Example of VirusTotal Report.
1 [Critical] App Sandbox Permission Checking:
2 [getSharedPreferences]
Lcom/google/android/gms/flags/impl/zzb$1;->zzvw() Landroid/content/SharedPreferences;
3 [openFileOutput]
Lcom/mopub/mobileads/AdAlertReporter;->addImageAttachment(Ljava/lang/String;
Landroid/graphics/Bitmap ;)V
4 [Critical] <Implicit_Intent > Implicit Service Checking:
5 com.yandex.metrica.MetricaService
6 [Critical] <SSL_Security > SSL Connection Checking:
7 \protect\vrule
width0pt\protect\href{http://a.applovin.com /}{ http ://a.applovin.com/}
8 Lcom/applovin/impl/sdk/bw;-><clinit >()V
9 [Critical] <WebView ><Remote Code Execution ><#CVE -2013 -4710# > WebView RCE
Vulnerability Checking:
10 Lcom/startapp/android/publish/slider/b;->b()V --->
11 Landroid/webkit/WebView;->addJavascriptInterface(Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String ;)V
Listing 1.5. Simplified Example of AndroBugs Report.
boosting security analysis of Android apps, in this work, we also collect several
security reports from well-known tools that we share to the research community.
– VirusTotal Report: VirusTotal1 is a free service that leverages over 50
anti-virus products to analyze suspicious files including Android apps. We
have sent all the AndroZoo apps to VirusTotal and consequently collected
the security reports for all of those apps. Listing 1.4 illustrates a simplified
example of VirusTotal report, where four anti-virus products (i.e., Bkav,
ESET-NOD32, Fortinet, and AVG) have flagged app 00010F as malicious
while the remaining anti-virus products such as McAfee, Qihoo-360 do not
flag it as such.
– AndroBugs Report: AndroBugs2 is an Android vulnerability scanner that
assists developers or hackers find potential security vulnerabilities in Android
apps. Listing 1.5 presents a simplified example of AndroBugs report, which
not only discloses the critical vulnerability problems but also reveals the
exact point where the vulnerability appears.
In a near future, we plan to also include the security reports of other well-
known tools such as FlowDroid and IC3.
1 https://virustotal.com
2 https://www.androbugs.com
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3.6 Others
In addition to the aforementioned metadata, in this work, we also collect several
advanced ones that are collected following specific rules.
– Piggybacking App Pairs: Piggybacking constitutes a specific subset of
repackaging, is defined in the literature as an activity where a given Android
app is repackaged after manipulating the app content, e.g., to insert a ma-
licious payload, an advertisement library, etc. In this work, we provide to
the research community a set of piggybacking pairs that are collected based
on the following rules: 1) The original app is benign while the piggybacked
app is malicious. 2) The two apps share the same application ID. 3) The
two apps are signed by different signatures (one must not be the real one).
4) The two apps are developed based on the same SDK version. 5) The two
apps have over 80% of similarity in terms of app code.
– Common/Ad Libraries: Despite some efforts on investigating Android li-
braries, the momentum of Android research has not yet produced a complete
set of common libraries to further support in-depth analysis of Android apps.
We, therefore, leverage a dataset of about 1.5 million apps from Google Play
to harvest potential common/ad libraries. With several steps of refinements,
we finally collect a set of 1,113 libraries supporting common functionality
and a set of 240 libraries for advertisement.
– App Lineages: App lineages, which represent the evolution history of a
given app (cf. Listing 1.6 illustrates an app lineage example), is valuable for
various research directions. For example, they can be leveraged in practice
to infer API usage updates that app developers adopt with respect to API
changes in the framework. They can also be used to infer bug fix patterns and
vulnerability repair schemes. Our main objective in this work is to present
to the community a large set of app lineages that can later be leveraged by
researchers and practitioners to support or facilitate their analyses.
4 Implications
Fig. 1 presents an overview of possible implications that we have explored so
far based on the AndroZoo apps and their meta-data that we pre-compute for
facilitating high-level analyses. In a nutshell, the implications on mining Android
apps are mainly located in three dimensions: (1) Code analysis; (2) App evolution
analysis; and (3) Malware analysis; We now detail those research dimensions
respectively.
4.1 Code Analysis
ICC-Aware Analysis. Since Android apps can leak sensitive information care-
lessly or maliciously and malicious apps manipulate significantly more ICCs than
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1 %SHA256(VERSION_CODE)
2 134 D13BC666BD0AC04F052BABAF024257E92C4AC4484FF701EF485CFB64B3B19 (118)
3 7679 DFC9BF79F80517E038FE1177D810A888822E2A569143B4234ADA7BE60928 (120)
4 42 E9FF2BADF5A1A1B9ABDCE38633E18F94D8D448E7C7EE63661C6086F190EC49 (121)
5 B3C32223F3095AB23FD0E5B1776FFD8A49DAD3E19756EC96EC356371B7248863 (122)
6 A26A6424E243C5AD1AD1E4D564ED109A5D6D5D569560166852FD7EE65CCB4C80 (123)
7 C1DE441C3DC1DE7901062ECC31C92770F24FBF5DFDF1A5A8659B3DBCEF9EDF92 (130)
8 3104705 FFC077F677C06149FECA8C9090AA1CA1E2289808B1EAFB1FF27DAD31F (133)
9 ACF850967DA85BED5EA646E5A16AF5E6B2DD914F79D908A33E57C1CE91D034F3 (134)
10 1164 D359138EEB00621C2BE75B7F86FAB0A1AE53840A14AF763487458A0F4BFD (135)
11 63709 D29B632BBCF213F2DE86FAA504076A7ECFC44694BE4D626F38F0AB01A94 (136)
12 B282170AFAE0A78605FD1EF71C4C46477B1B727F2F3F8B7120F11EB5DEB8172F (138)
13 B2A00A677B7A480416349EEA394D4F9003E7F1CCE05792687B5357F0B5D147AA (141)
14 9F45A1EA7EFBE29E00C7D6CC1F9B8993C62720DA46FD2E8077E435733D235E32 (142)
15 EFB36CDF51C0721A5DF9753D43106ECD64D22E8CAA0ED5A20135A0F104869F3B (145)
16 296 F4FA58F16669A2A1B853F1FE55D7E7245B3F41B1DE394D96E41F7A9BF505D (151)
17 1DCEB8962D345F674A4DC83D0165D5A1816F310FCD9AD63E1BE6A591B2D21A89 (162)
18 C302071F4D2362C9C784E8704428A30E8EAE2B4BA3F2954F8C9D4E33ED7583DE (163)
19 6B377D3625DF8AAC6AD066550BB110F4D75F68BC98D15B697CD8A6E70EA464E5 (165)
Listing 1.6. An App Lineage Example (cf. App es.ligabbva.gi.main).
                                                                     Meta-Data
AndroZoo
Certificates Malicious Status ... ...
                                                     Mining Challenges
Code
Analysis
Malware
Analysis
App Evolution
Analysis
Fig. 1. Overview of Our Research Dimensions.
benign apps, we propose a static analysis approach named IccTA to detect pri-
vacy leaks crossing Android components, and crossing apps with the help of Ap-
kCombiner [8]. Unlike state-of-the-art approaches, which mainly detect privacy
leaks within single component, IccTA propagates context information among
components to support inter-component communication (ICC) analysis [9,10].
IccTA applies a code instrumentation based approach, i.e., change the code
before analyzing, in order to make the ICC analysis reusable to existing intra-
component analyzers. Listing 1.7 illustrates a code snippet showing an ICC-based
privacy leak. The device id, considered as sensitive information, is obtained and
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stored into an Intent object (lines 8-10) in Activity1. Then, an ICC method
startActivity is called, which switches the current execution from Activity1 to
Activity2. Finally, in Activity2, the device id is retrieved and is eventually sent
out of the device through sendTextMessage (lines 15-17).
1 // TelephonyManager telMnger; (default)
2 // SmsManager sms; (default)
3 class Activity1 extends Activity {
4 void onCreate(Bundle state) {
5 Button to2 = (Button) findViewById(to2a);
6 to2.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener (){
7 void onClick(View v) {
8 String id = telMnger.getDeviceId ();
9 Intent i = new Intent(Activity1.this ,Activity2.class);
10 i.putExtra("sensitive", id);
11 Activity1.this.startActivity(i);
12 }}) ;}}
13 class Activity2 extends Activity {
14 void onStart () {
15 Intent i = getIntent ();
16 String s = i.getStringExtra("sensitive");
17 sms.sendTextMessage(number ,null ,s,null ,null);
18 }}
Listing 1.7. Example of an ICC Leak.
This privacy leak cannot be detected by intra-component analyzers such
as FlowDroid [11], because the switching between Activity1 and Activity2 is
unfortunately decided only by the system and it is non-trivial to obtain it directly
at the code level [12,13]. Therefore, in this work, we present IccTA, a code
instrumentation based approach, which modifies the code to be analyzed in
a way that inter-component feature is mitigated. As an example, Listing 1.8
demonstrates the modifications made by IccTA for the ICC leak example shown
in Listing 1.7. The ICC method startActivity is replaced by a helper method
that simulates the ICC through Java code, resulting in a simplified code snippet
where ICC is no longer appearing. As a consequence, existing intra-component
analyzers such as FlowDroid can now detect the privacy leak shown in Listing 1.7
without any modification.
Reflection-Aware Analysis. Like ICC we introduced previously, reflection
is another challenge that usually causes static analyzers to yield false negatives.
Android developers heavily use reflection in their apps for legitimate reasons such
as providing genericity, maintaining backward compatibility, accessing inacces-
sible APIs [2], but also significantly for hiding malicious actions. Unfortunately,
based on our SLR [7], most state-of-the-art works do not take into account the
presence of reflective calls. Hence, we present DroidRA [14,15], a code instru-
mentation based approach, to tackle this issue in a non-invasive way. We first
model the reflection analysis problem to a constant string propagation problem
and then leverage the COAL solver [12] to infer the values of reflection-related
targets. Finally, we instrument the app code to replace reflective calls by tradi-
tional Java calls where the separated parts due to reflection are now connected.
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1 // modifications of Activity1
2 - Activity1.this.startActivity(i);
3 + IpcSC.redirect0(i);
4 // creation of a helper class
5 + class IpcSC {
6 + static void redirect0(Intent i) {
7 + Activity2 a2 = new Activity2(i);
8 + a2.dummyMain ();
9 + }
10 + }
11 // modifications in Activity2
12 + public void dummyMain () {
13 + // lifecycle and callbacks
14 + // are called here
15 + }
16 + public Activity2(Intent i) {
17 + this.intent_for_ipc = i; }
18 + public Intent getIntent () {
19 + return this.intent_for_ipc; }
Listing 1.8. Code Instrumentation for startActivity.
Experimental results demonstrate that DroidRA is capable of supporting state-
of-the-art static approaches to provide more sound and complete analyses.
Harvesting Parameter Values of Android APIs. Parameter values are
important elements for understanding the usage of Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) of certain Android APIs. For example, Android malware may
assign parameter values to certain APIs that are, statistically speaking, different
from that assigned by benign apps. Furthermore, not only for identifying security
issues, understanding the usage of parameter values could also benefit app de-
velopers by recommending to them possible inputs for certain APIs. Therefore,
there is a strong need to investigate the parameter values of Android apps. In
this work, we achieve this purpose by performing static code analysis, where we
introduce a prototype tool named ParamHarver to automatically extract API
parameter values from Android apps [16]. Our experimental investigations and
findings further illustrate that a thorough study of parameter values could be
leveraged in various scenarios.
Common Library Analysis. In a preliminary study, Wang et al. [17] have
found that over 60% of Android apps’ code is from common libraries, which may
not be relevant to certain analyses such as repackaging analysis. Indeed, there
are a number of research work that excludes libraries before performing their
analyses [18,19,20]. Despite some efforts on investigating common libraries, the
momentum of Android research has not yet produced a complete set of libraries
that can be taken as a whitelist to support further analysis. Therefore, in this
work, we leverage AndroZoo apps to perform a heuristic-based approach with
several steps of refinements to harvest potential common libraries, for which we
eventually collect 1,113 general libraries and 240 advertisement libraries. Fur-
thermore, based on the collected libraries, we have performed several empirical
studies that confirm our motivation: certain analyses such as repackaging anal-
ysis and malware detection should not take into account the library code, which
constitutes noise in app features, in order to produce accurate results.
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4.2 App Evolution Analysis
App Variant Analysis. App variants (or family, e.g., the different products of
the same company) usually embrace valuable information for evaluating extrac-
tive Software Product Line (SPL) adoption techniques, e.g., the reuse practices
among app variants [21].
Fig. 2 presents a tree model to select app variants from a set of to-be mined
Android apps, where each non-leaf node is represented by a package segment
(e.g., Baidu) while leaf node is represented by the remaining package segments
(e.g., BaiduMap). A branch from the root node (i.e., com) to a leaf node (e.g.,
BaiduMap) represents a unique package name (i.e., the Baidu Map). Because
each Android app can have different versions, e.g., each update will result in a
version, each leaf node has further been affiliated with a list of meta-data of app
versions. The time line of the vertical axis shows that the affiliated list is ranked
through times and the apps it contains are actually different versions of the app
indicated by the leaf node. Given a time point, the tree model also gives a way
to identify family variants. For example, as shown in the red dashed rectangle,
given the latest time point, we are able to collect a set of variants for company
com.baidu.
time
line
app 
variants
com
baidu
BaiduMap input browserhd.inter browser.appsbrowser.inter
v_16
... ...
v_01
v_03
v_02
v_01
v_07
... ...
v_01
v_03
v_02
v_01
v_02
v_01
variants
versions
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versions
Fig. 2. A Simplified Example Showing how App Variants and Versions are Selected.
In this research direction, based on a clustering-based approach, we have
collected in total 75,963 families of apps: The median number of variants in
a family is three and 760 collected families have over 100 variants. Through
a preliminary study on the collected app families, we have identified several
reuse cases adopted by Android app variants, including library reuse, automated
app generation, content-driven variants and device-driven variants [22]. With an
advanced study, we believe that more reuse cases, including semantic reuses, can
be identified on top of our collect app family variants.
Pairwise Similarity Analysis. We present a research framework called
SimiDroid [23] that supports multi-level pairwise similarity comparison of An-
droid apps, aiming at supporting the understanding of similarities or changes
among app versions and among repackaged apps. SimiDroid is designed as a
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plugin-based framework that has already integrated various comparison meth-
ods such as code-based or resource-based comparisons. In addition to detect
similar Android apps, we also perform a number of case studies on AndroZoo
apps to demonstrate the suitability of SimiDroid in providing explanation hints
for different usage scenarios. For example, we have leveraged SimiDroid to check
and validate the hypothesis of multi-generation repackaging, where an original
app identified in a repackaging pair is actually a repackaged app from a prior
repackaging generation [24].
Piggybacking Behaviour Understanding. Fig. 3 presents some basic
terms related to Android app piggybacking. Basically, the working process of
piggybacking is like this: Given an original Android app (referred to as carrier),
attackers first unpack it and then modify its code by injecting some additional
code (referred to as rider), and finally re-pack it back to a new app version
(referred to as piggybacked app). The injected code will be triggered thanks to
the so-called hooks, which connect the execution of carrier code to rider code.
Set of Android Apps
Carrier Rider
piggybacked APP (a2)
Hook
original
APP (a1)
Set of Piggybacked Apps
Set of Malware
Fig. 3. Piggybacking Terminology.
Despite many research works have been conducted in the literature to detect
piggybacked apps, the literature lacks a comprehensive study on the behaviour
of piggybacking. To this end, we construct a benchmark set of piggybacked app
pairs (through pairwise similarity analysis) and investigate the characteristics
of malicious piggybacked apps in comparison with their original counterparts.
Thanks to these comparisons, we have eventually observed many interesting
findings on the piggybacking process [1,25]. The findings are summarised as
follows:
1. The realisation of malicious behaviour is often accompanied by manipulation
of app resource files.
2. Piggybacking changes app behaviour mostly by tampering with carrier code.
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3. Piggybacked apps are potentially built in batches.
4. Piggybacking often asks for new permissions to allow the realisation of ma-
licious behaviour.
5. Piggybacking may recurrently request some specific permissions that are less
requested by non-piggybacked apps.
6. Piggybacking is probably largely automated.
7. Piggybacking may overly request permissions that have been already de-
clared by their original apps.
8. Piggybacking may introduce new user interfaces, implement new receivers
and services, but will not add new database structures.
9. Piggybacking often consists in injecting a component that offers the same
capabilities (i.e., Action, Category, etc.) as an existing component in the
original app.
10. Piggybacking may change the launcher component so as to trigger the exe-
cution of rider code.
11. Piggybacking is often characterised by a naming mismatch between existing
and newly injected components.
12. Piggybacking generally connects the malicious payloads to the benign carrier
code via a single method call, making it possible to automatically locate
grafted malicious payloads from piggybacked malicious apps.
13. Piggybacking hooks are generally placed within library code rather than in
core app code.
14. Piggybacking often reuses the to-be injected malicious payloads.
15. Piggybacking adds code which performs sensitive actions, often without re-
ferring to device users.
16. Piggybacking operations are distributed over well-known malicious behaviour
types.
17. Piggybacking increasingly hides malicious actions via uses of reflection and
dynamic class loading.
18. Piggybacking complicates app’s overall call graph, while rider code can even
largely exceed in size the carrier code.
19. Piggybacking is seldom conducted by authors of benign apps.
20. Piggybacking code brings more execution paths where sensitive data can be
leaked.
4.3 Malware Analysis
Potential Component Leaks. Potential Component Leaks are such attacks
that leak sensitive information through known ICC vulnerabilities such as Ac-
tivity Hijacking Attack and Broadcast Injection Attack [26]. In this work, we
have defined two types potential component leaks: 1) potential passive compo-
nent leak, which leaks everything a component receives from other components;
and 2) potential active component leak, which attempts to send sensitive infor-
mation to other components. In order to detect the aforementioned attacks, we
present a prototype tool named PCLeaks, which based on ICC vulnerabilities
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to perform data-flow analysis on Android apps to pinpoint potential component
leaks that could potentially be exploited by other components (or apps) [27].
ML-based Malware Detection. As a follow-up work of PCLeaks, we find
that potential component leaks are common in Android apps and that malicious
apps have manipulated significantly more potential component leaks than be-
nign apps. This evidence makes potential component leaks perfect candidates of
features for machine learning (ML) based malware detection. Towards verifying
this hypothesis, we take potential component leaks as features to train several
classification models (with different settings such as different benign/malware
ration, different ML algorithm, etc.) and perform 10-fold cross-validation to jus-
tify the ability to identify malicious Android apps. Our experimental validations
show high performance for identifying malware, demonstrating that potential
component leaks are useful for discriminating malicious from benign apps [28].
Topic-Specific Data-Flow Analysis. State-of-the-art work has shown that
both app descriptions [6] and sensitive data-flows [18] in standalone are capable
of discriminating malicious from benign apps. In this work, we take both app
descriptions (i.e., indicative of app topics) and sensitive data-flows (i.e., function-
ality implemented) into consideration for discriminating malware from benign
apps. At the beginning, we leverage adaptive LDA with GA, an advanced topic
model, to cluster apps different categories based on their descriptions. Then, we
use information gain ratio of sensitive data-flows to build so-called “topic-specific
data-flow signatures”. Finally, we leverage those signatures to characterise mali-
cious Android apps. Our experiments on 3,691 benign and 1,612 malicious apps
demonstrate that topic-specific data-flow signatures are useful and effective in
highlighting malicious app behaviour [29].
Malicious Payload Identification. As shown in Fig. 3, the malicious pay-
loads of piggybacked apps are usually triggered by a small piece of code called
hooks. If we are able to locate such hooks, we can accurately locate the mali-
cious payloads, and thus reducing the examination space for security analysts to
understand the malicious behaviour. To this end, we propose in this work a tool-
based approach called HookRanker [30], which provides rank lists of potential
malicious packages based on the way malware behaviour are revealed. With ex-
periments on a ground truth of piggybacked Android apps, we demonstrate that
HookRanker is helpful for locating malicious packages of piggybacked Android
malware.
5 Leveraging AndroZoo
Our AndroZoo dataset, as shown in the previous section, has already been used
by us to conduct various Android-based research in the field of Security and Soft-
ware Engineering [31]. It has also been frequently leveraged by our worldwide
fellow researchers to conduct world-class exploration [32,33,34]. In general, we
believe our dataset could be leveraged for investigating in the fields of Code Rec-
ommendation, large scale studies on API usage and adoption, coding patterns,
repackaging detection, Library detection and popularity analysis, Obfuscation
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techniques, Malware analysis, application similarity, etc. Our dataset, thanks to
its long-term coverage, is particularly well suited to enable evolution studies.
Indeed, our dataset, with the latest snapshot, contains more than 450 thousand
apps with over 28 app lineages for which each of them has 10 or more versions.
Access Conditions. We make our dataset available to the research com-
munity. Given the lack of a clear, universal copyright exemption for Research,
we request that researchers willing to access this dataset:
– Evaluate the legal situation of downloading and working on copyrighted ap-
plications with regards to their situation (local laws, host institution policy,
etc);
– Do not, in general, redistribute the data;
– Do not, in particular, make a commercial usage of this data;
– Act responsibly with this data, notably with regards to the maliciousness of
many apps;
– Get a faculty, or someone in a permanent position, to agree and commit to
those conditions.
We politely ask that the origin of the dataset be acknowledged, and we hope
that researchers will make available the lists of apps used in their publications
to ensure their experiments are reproducible.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the AndroZoo dataset of millions of Android apps collected
from various data sources and their metadata collected via various means. So
far, we collected over five million apps and over 30 artefacts of metadata asso-
ciated with them. We make these datasets readily available to the community
to contribute to more reliable and reproducible studies based on a large-scale,
representative, and up-to-date samples.
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